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Abstract. Current research into the social construction of ignorance holds either that 
ignorance is produced by conscious strategies or is an unintended effect of knowledge 
production organization. This article moves beyond that opposition by taking into ac-
count the reflexivity of actors operating within the organized systems that produce 
ignorance. What happens when those actors become aware of flaws or limitations in 
the routines that structure their action? What change dynamics are triggered by this 
new awareness? The case studied here is arrangements in France for protecting farm-
ers from being poisoned by the pesticides they use. We show how the ban on sodium 
arsenite that went into effect in France in 2001 allows actors to tolerate “uncomfortable” 
knowledge of the sort that calls into question the ordinary institutional arrangements 
surrounding the ban. We bring to light the mechanisms by which the organizations that 
produce this uncomfortable knowledge also provide their members with “good reasons” 
to ignore it, defusing or neutralizing their critical faculties and impeding moves to make 
the institutional changes that should follow from that knowledge. 
Keywords. ProDuction of ignorance—PesticiDes—farmers—occuPational 
health—risk assessment
Why does it take so long to become aware of the health impact of products 
known to be toxic such as tobacco and asbestos? Why does it take so long to dem-
onstrate their harmfulness? These questions are the driving force behind a field 
of research on the production of ignorance in public health. Following Robert K. 
Merton’s pioneering study of incomplete knowledge (1987), Mary Douglas’s on insti-
tutional memory (1995) and Niklas Luhmann’s on the ecology of ignorance (1998), 
these studies work to show that, contrary to widespread understanding, ignorance 
cannot be defined as the mere absence of knowledge (Heimer, 2012) or an “origi-
nal void” (Proctor, 2012) that can be filled by newly acquired knowledge, but may 
instead be the product of social construction, a move by individual or collective ac-
tors to pay attention to some available information and disregard other information. 
Ignorance here refers to situations where knowledge available for guiding action is 
simply not used.
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Translated by Amy Jacobs
Our thanks to Giovanni Prete for reading over the text and to Jorge Munoz for his active 
contribution. This article draws on an empirical study that was funded as part of an ANSES 
(French national agency for food, environmental and worker health and safety) grant for re-
search in health and the environment (APR EST [2008-2012], Project C2012/2/135).
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According to one set of studies in this area, ignorance is the product of conscious 
strategies by actors who have something to gain from maintaining unawareness of 
the risks involved in given substancies or technologies. Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. 
Conway’s Merchants of Doubt (2010) and Robert N. Proctor’s study of tobacco com-
panies (2012) have shown how the tobacco industry, on the grounds of what it claimed 
to be more rigorous scientific research than that being done by its opponents, worked 
to keep the question of whether cigarette smoking was hazardous to health open as 
long as possible and to sustain doubt. In the last few years, a new approach, combin-
ing sociology of science and political science, has been putting forward an alterna-
tive interpretation of situations where ignorance of health and environmental risks is 
claimed, an interpretation that instead emphasizes involuntary and systemic means of 
producing ignorance. These studies show that the organizations in charge of assessing 
and monitoring risk are structurally dependent on scientific disciplines and tools that 
orient how they see—or fail to see—the dangers that it is their job to prevent. The 
tests and standards these organizations use supposedly enable them to measure—and 
so to control—the dangers. But they also reduce the ecological complexity of those 
dangers down to their most readily quantifiable dimensions. Authorities in charge 
of assessing and managing health risks end up learning “more and more about less 
and less” (Frickel and Edwards, 2014: 223). In the long run, this tendency to focus 
on numbers works to “institutionalize ignorance” (Kleinman and Suryanarayanan, 
2013) by systematically excluding available knowledge that is not compatible with the 
routines used by public authorities to identify and prevent health risks. 
The literature on involuntary ignorance production offers stimulating insights 
into the causes of the non-knowledge surrounding certain risks. However, and 
paradoxically, despite the fact that these studies often describe ignorance as the 
product of a type of “organization” (Frickel and Edwards, 2014) that allows for 
picking and choosing from available knowledge, they do not draw on insights from 
the sociology of organizations. There are in fact two blind spots to this research, 
and they are the subject of this article. First, authors of studies on the involuntary 
production of ignorance seem themselves to ignore the reflexivity of the actors 
they study, whereas reflexivity has been a central dimension in classic sociology 
of organizations (Friedberg, 1993)1 and institutions (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011)2 
since Anthony Gidden’s work on the “duality of structure” (1984). Because these 
studies emphasize matching between knowledge and risk management “policy 
frameworks ” they do not take into account risk prevention organization actors’ 
ability to critically view the tools they use to fulfill their missions. They have no 
trouble imputing ignorance production to “involuntary” dynamics, because the actors 
they study seem entirely devoid of any will of their own. And yet it seems reasonable 
to assume that actors using tools such as in vivo tests to measure environmental 
substance toxicity are at least as aware as political scientists and sociologists of 
dimensions that are missing from their scientific and regulation-related production. 
We can therefore reasonably assume that they can use that reflexive ability to raise 
questions that their routine use of those tools tends structurally to leave in the dark, 
1. Erhard Friedberg uses “autonomy” rather
than “reflexivity” to designate actors’ ability to 
take a critical view of the regulatory structures 
they belong to (Friedberg, 1993: 223). 
2. Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam (2011)
put reflexivity at the core of their program, but 
their aim is to propose a broader social theory 
in which society is conceived of as a set of 
“strategic action fields.”
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and therefore that they can set about changing their institutions. This leads us to the 
second, complementary question that is likewise absent from studies of involuntary 
organized ignorance, and that is, how do organizations react to criticism, which 
inevitably involves using reflexive ability, when what the criticism reveals are areas of 
ignorance actually produced by organization routines? An entire current of research 
into secrecy production in organizations has gone some way to providing an answer. 
Diane Vaughan’s study of organization secrecy (1996) shows how task specialization 
and geographical and social separation led NASA workers to ignore accident warning 
signs during the launch of the Space Shuttle Challenger in 1986. More recent studies 
adopt a Weberian perspective in which secrecy is understood to be an inherent 
characteristic of bureaucracies; they show how government bureaucratic structures 
continue to keep secrets regardless of how much their members may know of them 
(Maret and Goldman, 2008). 
With these remarks in mind, we examine here an ignorance producing mechanism 
that has not been widely studied, focusing on how the organization provides its 
actors with resources for legitimating and perpetuating ignorance and continuing 
not to take into account or integrate surprise events. Our subject is policies for 
preventing occupational diseases related to farming pesticides. France is one of 
the world’s main users of “plant protection products” for protecting crops and 
increasing yields.3 Farmworkers in France are heavily exposed to such products, 
which are, by definition, toxic for living organisms. However, their pathogenic 
effects on workers remain stubbornly invisible. The farming branch of the country’s 
national health insurance system has recognized a few dozen occupational diseases 
as due to pesticide exposure, but those figures seem very low compared to available 
data (Jouzel and Prete, 2013). The first epidemiological studies on the question in 
France only got underway in the late 1990s, and their results are fragmentary.4 
And yet, epidemiological studies on the same issue in other countries highlight 
a clear connection between occupational exposure to pesticides and a number of 
neurodegenerative diseases (most notably, Parkinson’s disease) as well as blood 
and bladder cancers. These data were obtained in agricultural contexts that differ 
from the French ones in terms of affected population and cultural practices and are 
therefore difficult to extrapolate from, but they do suggest massive under-recognition 
of the occupational disorders linked to pesticide exposure. 
In an earlier article (Jouzel and Dedieu, 2013), we showed that the failure to 
recognize those disorders as occupational diseases was due in part to unintentional 
ignorance production dynamics in the organizations in charge of protecting the 
occupational health of farmers and farmworkers. The most important of these 
organizations are the Ministry of Agriculture and the farming branch of the health 
insurance system. The tools the use to give visibility to and prevent pesticide-linked 
occupational poisoning make those institutions structurally blind to the pathogenic 
effects of many types of occupational exposure to those products. But we go further, 
showing that the actors involved are still able to see the flaws in those tools to 
some degree. To account for this, we retrace the history of a study conducted 
3. According to the Union des Industries de
la Protection des Plantes (UIPP), 62,700 tons of 
pesticides were used in France in 2011, repre-
senting on average 5 kg of pesticides and active 
substances per hectare of arable land. 
4. This applies to an epidemiological cohort
study (the Agrican cohort) undertaken in 2005 
to improve assessment of cancer risk in farm-
ing populations, a study funded in part by the 
Mutualité Sociale Agricole (MSA).
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in the early 2000s by a set of actors in the institutions in charge of preventing 
occupational diseases in the farming sector, a study that brought to light poisoning 
due to the use of a carcinogenic plant protection product called sodium arsenite in 
winemaking. The results of their study revealed blind spots in the standard means of 
identifying and monitoring pesticide poisoning of workers. However, a decade later 
the incriminated processes have not been changed and the findings or knowledge 
acquired by the study on sodium arsenite have been continually ignored by the 
relevant occupational risk prevention organizations. This case therefore attests to 
the fact that while official arrangements for managing occupational risk in farming 
can produce knowledge that reveals flaws in actors’ own operating modes, they also 
enable actors to ignore that knowledge. 
To account for how this happened, we will be drawing on the findings of a 
qualitative survey made up of approximately one hundred semi-directive, in-depth 
interviews (each from between one and a half and four hours long) with the entire 
range of actors involved in the current controversies around official recognition 
of pesticide-use-related occupational diseases. The survey was conducted in the 
framework of a collective research program we are co-running with Giovanni 
Prete.5 The present article is based on a series of interviews we conducted at one 
time or another with the majority of participants in the scientific, political and 
administrative process that culminated in the banning of sodium arsenite. We have 
also studied scientific articles and documents from the Mutualité Sociale Agricole 
(MSA, the farming branch of France’s NHI system) and other organizations showing 
how arsenic and arsenic derivatives were used in winemaking.6 The article is 
divided into three parts. We first show how the principles and tools of the system 
for assessing occupational risk in farming blocked circulation of knowledge about 
diseases caused by exposure to pesticides. We then describe the study on exposure 
to sodium arsenite, highlighting the reflexive and critical abilities of system actors 
when it came to assessing instruments and principles for monitoring exposure to 
pesticides. Lastly, we show how the rules, division of labor and risk management 
tools used encouraged other actors to disregard such criticisms. In the conclusion 
we demonstrate that the ignorance in question was “organized” in that it is deeply 
embedded in the structures of the risk management system: all of those structures 
amount to ways of “domesticating” the critical faculties of system members. 
Invisible poisoning
There is much controversy and scientific uncertainty about whether workers ex-
posed to pesticides are thereby exposed to particular diseases. Among active plant 
protection substances that have been approved for marketing are dozens of mol-
ecules classified as “Carcinogenic, Mutagenic or toxic to Reproduction” (CMR.) 
While the most harmful have been taken off the market, it is perfectly reasonable 
to assume that those substances have already caused chronic diseases with latency 
periods that may extend to several decades. Moreover, a considerable number of 
5. Giovanni Prete is a member of the IRIS
research group, Université de Paris 13.
6. It should be specified that the section of
our study on the history of the sodium arsenite 
ban is not based on interviews with final prod-
uct users. No institutions representing farmers 
(either independent ones or farmworkers) took 
part in the ban process studied here.
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“substances of very high concern because of possible CMR effects” are still for sale. 
However, the common assumption is that farmers are protected from poisoning by 
an arsenal of measures and norms, one that has gradually been strengthened over the 
last half century. We show here that at both the national and local levels in France, 
the rules, principles and tools used in the official system for monitoring pesticide-
induced occupational risk foster and maintain ignorance of the effects such products 
have on the bodies of agricultural workers. 
An organizational system for managing and preventing occupational risk among 
pesticide-exposed farmworkers can be identified in France, even though it has no 
legal existence. That system consists of a heterogeneous grouping of organizations 
and tools that came into existence over a long period of time, from World War II to 
the late 1990s. It is made up primarily of the MSA (Mutualité Sociale Agricole, the 
farming-sector branch of the national health and social security system), the Ministry 
of Agriculture, and a commission in charge of assessing pesticide-related health and 
environmental risks that is now part of the Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire 
de l’Alimentation, de l’Environnement et du Travail or ANSES [national agency 
for food, environmental and worker health and safety] after long being overseen 
by the Ministry of Agriculture. Governance of chemical and occupational risk in 
agriculture involves three key regulatory and operational activities: determining 
the effects of toxins on workers’ health and calculating an “acceptable” exposure 
threshold; recommending rules for toxic substance use that will keep workers below 
that threshold; and post-product approval monitoring of poisoning cases in order to 
further define plant protection product use regulations. These activities all fit into a 
“controlled use” pesticides policy7 (Décosse, 2013) in which, though the substances 
in question are recognized to be potential threats to workers’ health, operators are 
understood to be able to manage the risks involved if they take into account the 
threshold values and use the prescribed safety equipment. It is on the basis of this 
assumption, and scientific instrumentation of it, that ignorance about links between 
pesticides and workers’ health is in part produced. 
Agricultural pesticides: 
controlled but little-known toxic substances
Before pesticides can be sold they have to be officially approved through a 
process focused on effectiveness and demonstrations that they are not harmful 
to human health or the environment. The risks associated with active substances 
and agents are assessed at the European Union level in accordance with criteria 
that have been gradually harmonized through a series of directives; specifically, 
91/414/EEC, passed in 1991, and regulation 1107/2009, passed in 2009. The relevant 
EU authority at the present time is the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). 
Risks inherent in commercial products containing those substances, on the other 
hand, are assessed by member states themselves, who decide whether a given prod-
uct can be sold in that country. In France, the Ministry of Agriculture was in charge 
of assessing and managing product risks until 2005. Since then the task has been 
7. The term assumes a polemical cast here because it so strongly evokes the way the asbestos prob-
lem was handled in France from 1970 to 1990. Nonetheless, it clearly expresses a prevention option 
in which, though the hazard is acknowledged, it is also thought to be acceptable because of all the 
arrangements that supposedly protect exposed workers: limit values, protective equipment, etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 D
ocum
ent downloaded from
 www.cairn-int.info - Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris -   - 193.54.67.92 - 30/01/2017 14h38. © Presses de Sciences Po 
How to Ignore What One Knows
96, Revue française de sociologie, 56-1, 2015
performed not by an internal ministerial commission but rather by an independent 
administration—currently ANSES. ANSES transmits its conclusions on pesticide 
hazards to the ministry, which then uses them to determine whether or not to ap-
prove marketing the pesticide.8 Plant protection product approval must be renewed 
every ten years through a new evaluation process. At both the EU and national levels, 
risk assessment procedures include an industrial hygiene component where the aim 
is to define conditions for safe occupational use of the substance or product. This 
classically involves assessing danger and exposure,9 i.e.—in theory—learning about 
the occupational risks involved and determining effective ways to control them.
While the knowledge produced during risk assessment procedures does allow 
actors to identify and measure the adverse effects of pesticides on a population of 
exposed workers, it is nonetheless limited by the fact that assessments are predictive. 
The models used to measure pesticide harmfulness and exposure are simplifications 
that only partially account for interactions between these substances and farmers’ 
bodies. The flaws inherent in the measuring instruments used in these assessments 
have already been pointed out (Nash, 2004; Jouzel and Dedieu, 2013). Harmfulness 
is measured essentially through in vivo toxicity tests on laboratory animals, a 
method that identifies acute and sub-acute effects of sporadic exposure to relatively 
high doses of a single, isolated pesticide. It is therefore not very useful in identifying 
chronic effects of repeated, long-term exposure to low doses of a variety of plant 
protection substances—the kind of exposure that occurs in routine agricultural 
work (irrigation, pruning, harvesting, etc.) in pesticide-sprayed fields. “Acceptable 
operator exposure level” (AOEL) calculations for workers are aimed primarily at 
avoiding the adverse effects that occur when farmers handle the product directly or 
re-enter pesticide-treated fields too soon after application; they therefore tell us little 
about the effects of more diffuse, less concentrated exposure. 
Little attention has been paid to the problems inherent in measuring workers’ 
exposure using this kind of pesticide risk assessment. Measurements are based 
primarily on models10 that use data from field studies most of which are conducted by 
industrial companies. Those data can hardly be said to cover all exposure situations, 
and they have been extrapolated for all crops on which the product up for marketing 
approval may be used. Furthermore, the models quantify the protection ensured by 
a variety of equipment (gloves, masks, suits) by assigning them coefficients. This 
is done using hypotheses on how the product penetrates the organism of exposed 
workers. In practice, however, only skin penetration and, in second position, lung 
penetration, are taken into account. Digestive tract penetration, understood to result 
from severe worker negligence (e.g., eating or smoking in areas where the product 
is being used) or else deliberate swallowing (as in suicide attempts using pesticides), 
is not included. An industrial company applying for product marketing approval 
has to use these models to demonstrate that in normal use conditions and with the 
assistance of protective equipment if necessary, worker exposure levels will be lower 
than the acceptable one. It is up to the risk assessment commission to validate these 
8. The 2014 law for the future of agriculture,
food and forests transfers responsibility for 
plant protection products from that marketing 
approval body to ANSES.
9. On risk assessment procedures and their
history, see Boudia (2014). 
10. The models were first used in Britain
(UK Predictive Operator Exposure Model or 
POEM) and the German Federal Republic 
(BBA model) and are currently being harmo-
nized at the EU level by the EFSA.
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calculations and to the Ministry of Agriculture11 to approve or refuse to authorize 
sale of the given pesticide in France. The models induce actors to attribute a crucial 
role to personal protection equipment (PPE) in occupational pesticide poisoning 
prevention—a problematic choice in light of a series of recent ergonomics and 
epidemiology studies (Garrigou, Baldi and Dubuc, 2008; Baldi et al., 2012) that 
point up the ineffectiveness of some of the equipment recommended on certified 
product labels. But because its conclusions are based on predictive assessment 
of pesticide-induced occupational risks, the commission is not likely to take into 
account empirical ergonomic data. It concentrates instead on defining acceptable 
exposure levels and formulating rules for use—particularly what equipment should 
be worn—that will ensure that operator exposure remains below those levels. 
Poisoned bodies that remain invisible to prevention institutions
The official understanding that occupational pesticide poisoning can be controlled 
by setting maximum exposure levels and explaining to farmers how to use pesticides 
and what protective equipment to wear influences post-product approval action by 
local implementers of occupational health policies. Most of them belong to the MSA, 
an organization of central importance in this article. The MSA was established in 
1952. It is a private organization, run jointly by representatives elected by three “col-
leges”: independent farmers, agricultural sector employers, and employees. The MSA 
runs the farming branch of the national health insurance and social security system. 
Its tasks therefore include prevention and compensation for occupational diseases in 
this sector.12 An occupational health service of physicians specialized in farm work 
and prevention councilors are in charge of prevention. Since 1973, the MSA’s 230 
prevention councilors have also been in charge of assessing occupational risk in farms 
that request it and organizing farmworker training. The 380 occupational physicians, 
meanwhile, monitor farmworkers’ health and screen them for occupational diseases 
during compulsory medical visits. One-third of their time is officially devoted to 
prevention tasks. Compensation entitlements are determined on an application basis 
by approximately 200 medical officers (farmworkers have been eligible for compen-
sation since 1955; independent farmers since 2002). All these actors operate out of 
local MSA offices and contact centers spread throughout mainland France. 
Until relatively recently, they were only marginally attentive to pesticide-related 
health problems (Jas, 2010). It was not until the late 1990s that the MSA began 
recognizing disorders caused by pesticides as occupational diseases. Few Ministry of 
Agriculture farm work disease tables mentioned disorders of the sort, and most were 
benign and involved little in the way of compensation.13 And as far as prevention was 
11. According to the implementation schedule
for the 2014 law for the future of agriculture, 
food and forests, all of these tasks are to be 
carried out by ANSES from summer 2015.
12. The MSA is also in charge of paying out
retirement pensions, family and other welfare 
allocations and health care reimbursements.
13. Of the first 14 farming-related occupa-
tional disease tables established in 1955, only 
two included dangerous pesticides. This situa-
tion was slow to change. Only in 1986 was the 
occupational origin of cancers caused by  arsenic 
and arsenic derivatives recognized (Table 10), 
despite the fact that the Ministry of Agriculture 
had prohibited these substances as carcinogenic 
in the early 1970s. The Ministry and the MSA 
have recently reexamined the issue of recogniz-
ing pesticide-related occupational disorders: in 
2012 the Commission Supérieure des Maladies 
Professionnelles (COSMAP, higher commission 
on occupational disorders) recognized that Par-
kinson’s disease can be induced by pesticides. 
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concerned, the MSA position was that the product marketing approval procedure 
effectively protected pesticide-exposed workers.
In the 1980s, however, the MSA did put the issue of pesticide-related occupational 
poisoning on its agenda. In 1991, it set up a poisoning surveillance network that by 
1997 covered all of mainland France. That network brings together MSA occupational 
physicians and prevention councilors whose task is to report all intoxication cases 
they learn of through farmers or farmworkers to toxicologists who then determine 
whether or not the pathology can be imputed to the product used. Whenever an 
intoxication case is reported, the affected farmer or farmworker receives a visit from 
an occupational physician and/or prevention councilor. The point is to determine 
what caused the poisoning. The physician or councilor may also observe that the 
instructions and recommendations for use on the particular product are insufficient. 
Today, this network is the only form of regular post-product-approval monitoring 
of pesticide-related occupational risk in France. One of its functions is to send 
up information “from the field” to the commission in charge of predictive risk 
assessment in connection with product marketing approval.
However, the network captures few poisoning cases. An average of 200 are 
reported annually14—few, given the extent of the surfaces to which pesticides are 
applied, the number of exposed farmworkers,15 and an MSA survey questionnaire 
showing that one in five farmworkers experience pesticide-related physical disorders 
every year (Dupupet et al., 2007). There are several reasons for the underreporting. 
It is partially explained by farmers’ attitudes of “denial” or “defiance” (Nicourt 
and Girault, 2009) toward contamination incidents; such incidents seem inevitable 
to them given the technical and economic constraints they are working under. 
Moreover, the network’s knowledge infrastructure is also a source of underreporting. 
Network toxicologists and councilors, MSA occupational physicians and prevention 
councilors all tend to consider occupational poisoning as occasional overexposure 
generally imputable to operator error, “bad practices” where the worker has 
not followed the recommendations on the product label; i.e., failure to wear the 
recommended PPE, poor hygiene, spraying or otherwise applying in strong wind, 
overuse, etc. Aware of this general interpretation, farmers who experience physical 
problems during plant protection product use are unlikely to report them to the 
competent medical authorities for fear of being symbolically sanctioned by MSA 
prevention professionals (Jouzel and Dedieu, 2013).
At the central and local levels, then, the organization of occupational risk 
prevention in this sector fosters exposed worker ignorance of how the pesticides 
they use may affect their bodies, an ignorance that appears systemic, linked as it 
is to the organization’s dependence on knowledge that is based on the assumption 
that pesticide poisoning amounts to occasional exposure to high doses of single 
products and therefore results from accidents that occur during product use. And 
that ignorance cannot, it seems, be reduced to any ill will on the part of organization 
14. During its first ten years of national-scale
operation, the pesticide exposure surveillance 
network collected 1,909 cases; 1554 were con-
firmed to have resulted from pesticide exposure 
and recorded in a database.
15. As specified by the INRA and CEMA-
GREF expert report (Aubertot et al., 2005: 9), 
there are no truly reliable data on the number 
of exposed farmworkers. However, according 
to farmer and farmworker census counts for 
2010, France has 604,000 farms and more than 
a million persons work on them.
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actors. Whether they like it or not, those actors are constrained by their work tools 
to ignore the reality of pesticide-related occupational poisoning. And yet they are 
not passive. They enjoy considerable autonomy within their organization, and this 
in turn means they are able to perceive the flaws or limitations of the tools that 
organization relies on to monitor poisoning of pesticide-exposed workers and to 
propose ways of correcting those problems and improving tool performance. At least 
that is what is suggested by the findings of a study conducted fifteen years ago by 
the MSA fund of the Hérault département, which identified an unexpected manner 
of contamination among vineyard workers exposed to sodium arsenite. 
Tracking sodium arsenite: 
official production of uncomfortable knowledge
The MSA is a decentralized organization made up of a network of local offices or 
funds and headed by a central fund. The central fund initiates prevention programs 
for farmworkers, but the programs themselves are defined in large part at the local 
fund level. The high degree of local independence is justified by the need to act as 
close to the field as possible and to ensure prevention effectiveness by taking local 
farming production specificities into account. Prevention professionals working in the 
funds are also highly independent: farming-sector occupational physicians and risk 
prevention councilors have a great deal of latitude in defining occupational risk pre-
vention priorities. Some local initiatives targeted pesticide-related poisoning even be-
fore the central fund put it on the institution’s agenda. This was the case in the Hérault 
département, where a series of initiatives by individual prevention professionals laid 
the foundation for a real investigation into how farmworkers get contaminated by 
pesticides. Their study of sodium arsenite exposure, focused on winemakers’ actual 
work and exposure conditions, attests to the ability of farming-sector risk prevention 
organization members to use their reflexivity and critical faculties to become aware 
of the flaws and limitations of their risk assessment tools. From their observations, 
which revealed considerable discrepancies between predictive risk assessment and 
the realities of exposure, a series of “uncomfortable” conclusions were drawn about 
official modes for assessing occupational pesticide exposure. 
Investigating unexplained poisoning cases
Winemaking is the main agricultural activity in the Hérault,16 and this sector 
heavily uses plant protection products.17 Some are particularly harmful to human 
health. One such is sodium arsenite, a fungicide used to combat esca or grape dis-
ease, which attacks grapevine trunks. Whereas all arsenic compound pesticides were 
banned by the Ministry of Agriculture in 1971 as too dangerous for human health, 
an exception was made for sodium arsenite in vineyard work because there was no 
effective substitute product. The idea in risk prevention institutions at the time was 
16. In 2010, winemaking was the main ac-
tivity of 80% of farms in the Hérault départe-
ment and represented over 10,000 full time jobs 
there (Agreste, 2011 data). 
17. Winemaking accounts for 3% of France’s
farmed surface area and nearly 20% of pes-
ticide use; the most widely used products are 
fungicides. 
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that worker exposure to sodium arsenite was so moderate that no damage was done. 
An MSA biometric sample study conducted in Bordeaux-region vineyards supported 
this: workers only sprayed for a few days in winter; exposure times were considered 
too brief to allow sodium arsenite to accumulate in the body; the contamination 
levels found were low. The fact that the International Agency for Research on Cancer 
(IARC) had classified the agent carcinogenic in 1987 had not brought about any 
changes in official risk management options in France. 
In the late 1990s, Gilles Bernard,18 an occupational physician in the Béziers 
sector of the Hérault, expressed concern about what he perceived to be an increase 
in vineyard worker poisoning in connection with sodium arsenite application. He 
had learned of some poisoning cases during routine medical visits to farmworkers; 
they complained of what he considered worrying symptoms: digestive problems, 
itching, tingling and prickling sensations, etc. But most reports came to him outside 
his professional activity. As he himself is a winemaker, he was in regular contact 
with both farmers and farmworkers, and thereby came to learn of cases of workers 
who did not dare report their cases to the prevention authorities. The accounts 
converged: everyone concerned explained that their disorders had come about after 
using sodium arsenite. The physician’s social proximity to the winemaking milieu 
enabled him to circumvent farmworkers’ reluctance to speak about ills that might 
be associated with exposure to chemical agents. Moreover, Dr Bernard noted that 
several of the reports concerned employees in companies specialized in pesticide 
application. In the 1980s and 1990s, economic changes in the Hérault vineyards had 
led winemakers to turn more readily than in the past to this specialized workforce. 
The number of holdings had fallen, and average lot size had risen, meaning that 
winemakers could realize considerable economies of scale by outsourcing pesticide 
application. The result was a new profile of sodium arsenite exposure,19 one that had 
not been considered when the product was reauthorized for marketing in 1971 or 
during the 1982 MSA study of Bordeaux vineyard work. 
In 1999 Gilles Bernard decided to study vineyard worker poisoning caused by 
exposure to sodium arsenite. To do so he requested and obtained support from the MSA 
central fund, which sent him a doctoral student in medicine to collect urine samples 
from exposed workers. The study was of four groups of approximately 15 individuals, 
each with a particular exposure profile: employees of specialized companies 
who were exposed over several weeks; workers—farmers and farmworkers—who 
occasionally treated their own grapevine trunks; workers who had performed tasks 
in the vineyards in the two weeks following pesticide application, and a control 
group not likely to have been exposed but living near the study population. The urine 
samples brought to light cases of severe contamination among workers in the first 
two groups (Grillet et al., 2004). These findings were an alert: they indicated the 
presence of a carcinogenic agent in the bodies of farmworkers, particularly pesticide 
application company employees exposed over long periods. The MSA’s pesticide 
poisoning surveillance network, which received reports of approximately 15 cases of 
sodium arsenite poisoning during its first two years of national-scale operation (1997 
and 1998), provided a concordant, if not as alarming, account. The alert went hand 
in hand with a mystery. Specialized employees were assumed to be particularly well 
18. All respondent names have been changed.
19. Here the annual exposure period came to nearly two months, as opposed to a few days for
winemakers treating their own vineyards.
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protected against the pesticides they handle: they receive training and are equipped 
with PPE and tractors aimed to guarantee their safety. The results of this first study 
suggested that the recommended “good agricultural practices” determined when the 
product was approved for marketing did not constitute effective protection. 
To solve the mystery, Gilles Bernard set out to develop an observation method 
that would enable him to understand how vineyard workers were contaminated when 
working with sodium arsenite. In this connection he consulted Jules Vernon, head 
of the Hérault MSA fund prevention service, a trained ergonomist long interested 
in the issue and circumstances of pesticide poisoning. In the late 1990s Vernon 
had developed a “pesticide self-diagnosis” tool to help raise farmers’ awareness 
of contamination sources during the pesticide-application process. Together, the 
physician and prevention specialist designed a tool for observing sodium arsenite 
contamination, a sequencing tool with which to note throughout the workday every 
movement likely to bring about contact between the product and the farmer’s body.20 
The MSA central fund helped them recruit assistants in local offices throughout 
France’s winemaking départements (Aude, Charente, Gard, Hérault, Indre-et-Loire, 
Lot, Maine-et-Loire, Pyrénées-Orientales, Rhône and Tarn) who then observed 35 
workers throughout the days they spent treating grapevine trunks for esca and took 
urine samples to capture possible arsenite contamination cases and identify how 
they occurred. The findings were written up in 2001 in a paper that qualified the 
author for a degree in rural medicine (Durand, 2001). 
The biometric component—i.e., the urine samples—demonstrated once again 
a clear correlation between exposure and contamination levels. The ergonomic 
component facilitated understanding of contamination circumstances and led to 
three rather surprising conclusions. First, contamination was most likely to occur not 
through direct contact of workers with the substance (i.e., during preparation of the 
mixture and possible contact during application) but rather in mixed, transition areas 
when workers moved from a “contaminated” area (e.g., containing the application 
device) to a “clean” one (the tractor cab just before application activity). Such 
transition areas proved likely spots for a chain of accidents to occur. For example, 
after mixing the product with water, the worker takes off his gloves, which have 
been contaminated with the substance, and in so doing contaminates his hands, 
protection equipment and working equipment (tractor, sprayer, etc.). Second, the very 
fact that there are several contaminated spots means that contact between workers’ 
contaminated hands and their mouths during food or cigarette breaks (especially 
if they do not wash their hands beforehand) or through unconscious movements 
made in the normal course of activity is inevitable. Lastly—and this third conclusion 
follows from the first two—even employees who had followed the safety instructions 
and were wearing their PPE got poisoned. Even the best-trained and protected 
workers—specialized company employees—could not avoid contamination. 
Official production of uncomfortable knowledge
The innovative approach used for the sodium arsenite contamination study 
generated a set of “awkward” data (Heimer, 2012) that could not be taken into account 
in any straightforward way because it would be a source of social disorganization. 
20. For a more detailed analysis of this observation method and the social conditions making it
possible, see Dedieu and Jouzel (2015).
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Following Steve Rayner (2012), we can describe this information as “uncomfortable 
knowledge” for the institutions that produce and receive it. According to Rayner, 
such knowledge threatens the “clumsy solutions” institutions devise for “wicked 
problems.” Our case of occupational pesticide poisoning monitoring suggests the 
relevance of broadening this definition, as it involves compromises that have become 
fully routinized. Produced as it was over a long institutional history, the above-
detailed official monitoring method continues to seem effective to the actors in 
charge of it despite the fact that the uncomfortable knowledge generated by the 
sodium arsenite study calls into question firmly established institutional rules and 
agreements of seemingly unobjectionable legitimacy. The study findings brought 
to light three flaws in standard pesticide poisoning prevention and risk assessment 
methods. First, the error of failing to take into account digestive penetration in 
assessing risks to workers. Because it objectified contamination cases—cases that 
are particularly worrying because they involve a carcinogenic agent—the study 
called into question the overall value of predictive assessment of pesticide-related 
occupational safety risks, and suggested that substances that appear to be under 
control as far as the public authorities are concerned may very well not be. Second, 
by making the discrepancy between risk assessment models and the reality of 
farmworker poisoning apparent, the study attested to the need for more rigorous 
post-product approval monitoring. Last, the study showed that prevention institutions 
are wrong to put their trust in PPE. In sum, the fact that the study was approved and 
funded by the MSA shows that the institution is capable of taking a critical view of 
the tools it commonly uses to ensure prevention. 
The uncomfortable nature of these findings quickly brought the study to the 
attention of the central level of the organization for the prevention of occupational 
risk in the farming sector. Even before definitive publication of the results, the 
Ministry of Agriculture’s plant protection product risk assessment commission had 
been contemplating banning sodium arsenite and having existing stocks destroyed. 
The Ministry followed this recommendation, issuing an order to that effect on 
November 8, 2001. Given the absence of alternative chemical agents for combating 
esca, the rapidity of the authorities’ response may seem surprising. In fact, the 
commission and the Ministry really had no choice given the clear carcinogenic nature 
of sodium arsenite. Allowing the product to remain on the market and in use was 
untenable, especially since, as the risk evaluation commission realized upon reading 
the study findings, it had underestimated the carcinogenic effects of the product for 
over fifteen years. Those effects had been proved in 1987, whereas labels on products 
containing the substance in France indicated only a “suspicion” of them. The ban 
could also be imposed so quickly because the industrial companies using the agent 
in their products had given up on obtaining marketing reapproval for them in 2002. 
As they saw it, the business value of a product used exclusively in the winemaking 
“niche” was too low to justify investing in an approval application that was likely to 
be rejected anyway given the general tightening of restrictions on pesticides. 
Organizational domestication of uncomfortable  
knowledge: how to remain ignorant once you know
The lessons learned from the MSA study extended beyond the ban on sodium 
arsenite. The organizations in charge of pesticide monitoring wanted to use the study 
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to improve tools for assessing and managing the occupational dangers caused by 
such products. A taskforce was created to this effect within the Ministry’s pesticide 
risk assessment commission. However, more than ten years later it has had no no-
table impact. The pesticide risk assessment models used still follow the assumption 
that digestive tract penetration is not relevant and that controlled use of pesticides 
is possible. Post-marketing approval tracking of occupational exposure has hardly 
changed. This situation is not due to any general shelving of the study or intention 
to suppress or conceal the uncomfortable knowledge it produced. Rather, despite 
their awareness of the critical impact of the uncomfortable study findings, occu-
pational poisoning prevention actors have managed to reduce that “discomfort” for 
themselves and the organizations they belong to. This process, which we are calling 
domestication of uncomfortable knowledge, is explained by the regulatory and or-
ganizational architecture of arrangements for managing and preventing occupational 
risk in the farming sector in France. The task specialization, rules, tools and profes-
sions involved in this inter-organizational system provide actors with plenty of re-
sources and “good reasons” for discounting or simply not heeding the uncomfortable 
knowledge in question. Three mechanisms are involved in the domestication pro-
cess: a weakening of the inter-professional and therefore “interdisciplinary” research 
perspective that made the study possible (it was the fruit of collaboration between 
a physician and a prevention specialist); displacement of the study’s uncomfortable 
conclusions through translation of them into terms compatible with the major ori-
entations of the established program for preventing and managing pesticide-related 
risks; and fragmentation of responsibility for post-marketing approval tracking of 
occupational poisoning, a situation that creates and maintains the illusion that exist-
ing arrangements for surveillance of the pathogenic effects of pesticides on workers’ 
health are effective. 
Weakening: the impossibility of reproducing 
an interdisciplinary study
The story of the sodium arsenite study shows that combining disciplinary per-
spectives and methods for observing pesticide-induced occupational poisoning can 
bring to light what remains in the dark when the problem is studied from a single, 
dominant perspective. However, this unprecedented, extremely productive interdisci-
plinary undertaking was reiterated only once by the MSA, in a study study conducted 
in 2002 and 2003 on winemakers’ exposure to a set of fungicides called dithiocar-
bamates. That study observed 56 subjects using the same biometric tool—urine sam-
ple collection—designed for the sodium arsenite study. It showed that wearing a mask 
improved protection whereas wearing gloves did not. However, those results could in 
no way be seen to validate the sodium arsenite study findings, as sodium arsenite was 
sold in liquid form whereas dithiocarbamates are sold as powder, making exposure 
circumstances virtually incomparable. Because the sodium arsenite study observa-
tion protocol was used to measure exposure to pesticides sold in a different form, it 
has not been possible to reproduce or generalize its findings, a fact that considerably 
limits their uncomfortable or awkward nature for the organizations in charge of as-
sessing and preventing pesticide-induced risks. In fact, there is no proof that what was 
observed for workers exposed to sodium arsenite holds for other products. 
The way the MSA is organized goes a long way toward explaining why such 
multidisciplinary projects are extremely difficult to extend or reiterate regardless of 
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the value of the data they produce. There are two major parts to the explanation. 
The first is that the system is set up in such as way that occupational physicians 
and prevention councilors do not usually come in contact with each other. The 
considerable autonomy each group has for organizing its activity, combined 
with strong status asymmetries, lead them to work separately. As explained, the 
occupational physicians spend one-third of their working hours developing specific 
prevention research projects and actions such as training programs and awareness-
raising or information campaigns. And the fact is that they often think of that work 
as secondary. As they see it, those time-consuming projects draw them away from 
their primary task of medical surveillance, including hiring-related consultations, 
work resumption and pre-work resumption examinations, and various surveillance 
exams.21 Conversely, prevention councilors are often reluctant to use their budget 
allowances to develop collaborative work programs with physicians due to the status 
inequality between the two professional groups. While farming-sector occupational 
physicians enjoy the protected status of the medical profession, prevention specialists 
are a fragmented group made up of heterogeneous members who have not all had 
the same training. In addition to feeling that physicians are likely to think of them 
as subordinates, prevention councilors fear that the symbolic resources physicians 
enjoy mean that they alone will benefit from jointly conducted projects: 
There’s a dichotomy in the MSA system between physicians and prevention special-
ists. Doctors have the status while preventers have money but no status. So the one who’s 
got status uses it to get money. [Farmers’] occupational healthcare dues are used to pay for 
medical visits, so once the medical exams, etc. have been paid for, they [the physicians] 
don’t have much left. In prevention, on the contrary, budgets are hefty, and a doctor who 
wants to do occupational covets those funds. So there’s a war between the doctors, with their 
occupational physician status, and the preventers, at best office heads and at worst project 
officers. The MSA is labor inspectors, social workers, etc., all covered by the same labor 
accords. The doctors, on the other hand, they’re rural life and historical status. The farmers 
say, “Good morning, Doctor”—they’re the only ones who get addressed like that. So there’s 
that relationship going on here. (Interview with Jules Vernon, September 2010). 
The study that led to the ban on sodium arsenite offers a concrete example 
of these different obstacles. The first reason the product could be banned was Dr 
Bernard’s concern to neutralize the statutory asymmetry between physicians and 
prevention specialists, which he did by assuming a “low profile” vis-a-vis the head 
of the prevention service at his own MSA fund. Second, the ensuing collaboration 
between Bernard and Vernon was due to a circumstantial convergence of interests: 
Bernard had to form an alliance with Vernon to obtain the human resources he 
needed to carry out the kind of study he wanted, while for Vernon that alliance of-
fered an opportunity to publicize the knowledge he had acquired about farmer and 
farmworker contamination conditions so that his preventer colleagues in other MSA 
funds could benefit from it. With their alliance in place, the two men were able to 
convince their colleagues to undertake the study. The operation succeeded largely 
due to Vernon’s energetic efforts to get prevention councilors from other funds on 
board for the observation and urine samples: 
There was a meeting in Paris … that was crucial. It was run by central fund physi-
cians. … Prevention doctors came in from Lyon, Bordeaux, Nantes, all the big wine-pro-
ducing regions, Maine-et-Loire … The thing was getting bogged down because not all the 
21. See Munoz (2014).
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doctors wanted to do the job because they weren’t invested to the same degree as Gilles 
[Bernard]—far from it—and the preventers didn’t support them [the doctors] because they 
didn’t want to be just water-carriers. … At the MSA you’ve got to convince people, get them 
on board; people don’t just agree. …. I immediately saw that it would be good to reap the 
fruits of what we’d done … in connection with work. You observe and you even take biologi-
cal measurements—from work activity to measurements. I told my [preventer] colleagues, 
“You can’t let a thing like this go by.” … So since I had a big reputation with my preventer 
colleagues … I turned things around. … I fought for it, and my friend from Angers [head of 
the Angers MSA prevention service] endorsed me and supported me and got us rolling and 
we went with it. (Interview with Jules Vernon, September 2010). 
And yet the collaboration between the doctor and the prevention councilor did 
not survive the study. Vernon was marginalized when it came to publishing the 
scientific data: his name appeared in fourth place for the first article and totally 
disappeared from the following articles, all written by MDs. Organizational changes 
at the MSA over the last decade have nonetheless worked to promote greater in-
terdisciplinarity between the various prevention specialist categories. Following 
the labor modernization law of January 17, 2002, which instated the principle of 
multidisciplinarity in occupational health services, rural medicine was merged with 
prevention counseling at the MSA to create new occupational health services. This 
change was an opportunity to bring physicians and preventers closer together. But 
it also had some unsought effects: most of the heads of the new, composite services 
are physicians and some prevention councilors now feel they are being overseen by 
doctors. Furthermore, the merger led Vernon to leave the MSA because he could not 
find a position that suited him in the new system. 
The second obstacle to lasting multidisciplinary collaboration at the MSA has 
to do with the organization’s structural dependence on the farming profession. Like 
the 35 local funds, the central fund is headed by an administrative council made 
up of 29 elected members, 27 of whom represent the three branches of the farming 
profession in France: employees, independent farmers and employers. This type of 
representation ensures that farm owners dominate because they are represented as both 
independent farmers and employers. The power of the FNSEA (National federation of 
farmers’ associations), the representative organization to which the vast majority of 
farm owners belong, reinforces this position; 22 employee unionization, meanwhile, is 
weak and fragmentary.23 This governance mode makes it difficult to conduct regular 
pesticide exposure studies at the MSA because they might end up depriving the 
profession of plant protection products deemed indispensable for high crop yields. 
While the power of professional farmers in the MSA does not hinder projects that 
prevention specialists may wish to implement—once again, they continue to enjoy 
considerable autonomy—it does limit the scope of those projects. So when sodium 
arsenite was banned—a decision that the winemaking profession judged harmful to 
its interests—the Hérault Fund refused to participate in an epidemiological study on 
links between pesticides and farmworker health funded in part by the central fund. 
22. At the last MSA delegate elections, held
in 2010, nearly half of the delegates elected by 
the “independent farmer” college were FNSEA 
members.
23. In the same elections, the CFDT (Confé-
dération Française Démocratique du Travail, 
commonly seen as a moderate union) obtained 
35% of the votes, while the CGT (Confédé-
ration Générale du Travail, leftwing union) 
obtained 21% and the CGC (Confédération Gé-
nérale des Cadres; employers) 19%. Abstention 
in the “employees” college was 71%, compared 
to 55% in the “independent farmers” and “em-
ployers” colleges. 
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Displacement: ambiguous interpretation of study data
Another factor that worked to marginalize the sodium arsenite study data in 
occupational health offices was that specialists sought to interpret them in accord-
ance with the prevention principles already structuring their official tasks. The “con-
trolled use” policy on which pesticide-related risk-management operations are based 
is in turn based on the understanding that plant protection products are intrinsically 
dangerous but that as long as farmers follow product labels instruction (determined 
during the marketing approval process) they can use them safely. MSA information 
campaigns and prevention training are of course designed to improve the chances 
of safe use. This means that the sodium arsenite study findings could only be under-
stood in terms of a resolutely prevention-oriented approach centered on regulations, 
official tasks, and the professions of the specialists who constitute the system. The 
actors did not bother to think about the systemic, inevitable nature of poisoning re-
vealed by the study, arguing instead—and it is here that the ambiguity arises—that 
the problem could be solved by improving instructions and recommendations for 
use. The uncomfortable data from the study were therefore displaced or subsumed 
under ordinary controlled pesticide use principles. 
It is true that the actors who participated in the study, namely the occupational 
physician whose idea it was in the first place, were conscious of the uncomfortable 
nature of the study findings and the flaws they revealed in the system for protecting 
pesticide-exposed workers. They recognized the flaws in their prevention tools, 
which, once again, were based on the assumption that all workers had to do was 
wear the proper PPE when working with pesticides: 
Basically, you reach the conclusion that even if you explain to farmers how to use the 
products, it’s so complicated they won’t be able to do it. So you’re deluding yourself if you 
think the solution is training them and getting them to wear PPE—that’s just a regulation 
alibi. … Instructions are made to be overlooked, misused. (Interview with Dr Bernard, 
April 2009)
And yet the actors relativized the critical impact of the sodium arsenite study 
findings. Specifically, they filtered the results through a “functional” perspective 
(Dodier, 1994) for improving existing systems, thereby limiting their own ability to 
take into account what they learned about pesticide poisoning. MSA doctors and pre-
vention specialists alike, together with risk assessment experts, have made a point of 
interpreting the data demonstrating poisoning inevitability in such a way as to make 
them consistent with the controlled use principle. Acknowledging that pesticide con-
tamination is caused by hand-to-mouth contact and the vicissitudes of everyday 
work activity would mean acknowledging that it cannot be controlled—a notion that 
is virtually inconceivable for actors whose primary professional task is risk preven-
tion. Because the study findings were too “abrasive” to fit into a functional perspec-
tive centered on improving existing arrangements, they have simply been set aside. 
The occupational physicians who participated in the study claim that controlled 
pesticide use is still possible but that control modes have to be revised. In the 
conclusion of the medical research paper produced during the second phase of the 
study, the authors sought to redefine effective prevention, explaining that it would 
be advisable always to have two persons applying pesticides so as to limit contact 
between “clean zones” and “contaminated ones.” The doctor who wrote up the report 
made the following admission: “The idea of protection for each zone exists but is 
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virtually impossible in practice” (Durand, 2001: 71). Nonetheless, he aligned his 
conclusions with the controlled use position. Following the ban on sodium arsenite, 
Dr Bernard himself, with the support of the MSA, created an original training 
program called Phyto-théâtre (Plant protection product theater), in which situations 
where workers were likely to get contaminated such as those observed in the study 
are staged and acted out. The aim is give farmers a direct image of circumstances 
in which they are likely to get contaminated and work organization modes that will 
reduce if not eliminate that possibility:24
Staging work situations like we do in my Phyto-théâtre makes the individual operator 
aware that [the work] isn’t so easy, that he’s got things to do, and that the best solution for 
managing his problem is not to try to do [the work] better but to find a few ways to make sure 
that incidents don’t happen. Plant protection product companies have started using Phyto-
théâtre because they understand the main point: farmers have got to be trained. (Interview 
with Dr Bernard, April 2009)
The fact that Dr Bernard had firm roots in local winemaking, a world char-
acterized by strong reluctance to discuss pesticide-related health problems, only 
strengthened his concern to promote this type of preventive and somewhat demand-
ing solution for winemakers. It will be noted that there are two aspects to relations 
between MSA specialists and the farming world that come into play in recognizing 
pesticide-related dangers: first, those relations make it possible to identify the “real” 
ways operators come to be poisoned—realities that official assessment models do not 
take into account—but second, they lead to relativizing the critical impact of research 
revealing discrepancies between those official models and reality. Uncomfortable 
knowledge has thus been displaced25 to make it fit with controlled use principles in 
response to “position” effects caused by organizational functions and “disposition” 
effects involving actors’ social embedding (Boudon, 1986). 
Likewise, members of the risk assessment commission have claimed that 
controlled pesticide use is still possible even while admitting the need for product 
labeling that will enable operators to organize their own protection more efficiently. 
This seemed enough to them to justify not including the digestive tract as a possible 
contamination route in risk evaluation models, despite their awareness of the 
study data indicating hand-to-mouth contact ingestion of plant protection product 
substances. Integrating oral contamination and the systemic nature of pesticide 
poisoning into risk assessment would mean for them acknowledging that risks have 
to be assessed in terms of real types of exposure even when they blatantly undermine 
the use recommendations that are part and parcel of marketing approval decisions. 
Because reorienting marketing approval criteria could lead to massive pesticide bans, 
commission members are in favor of maintaining the existing exposure assessment 
models:
24. However, an overall change may be ob-
served in MSA prevention messages. They in-
creasingly stress organization modes (stocking 
products in a “plant protection product base” or 
defining areas to be used for mixing and clean-
ing) rather than wearing PPE.
25. We are using the term displacement dif-
ferently than Rayner (2012). For him the term 
designates “the process by which an object or 
activity, such as a computer model, designed 
to inform management of a real-world phe-
nomenon actually becomes the object of man-
agement. Displacement … substitutes a more 
manageable substitute [for uncomfortable 
knowledge]” (p. 15). We have used it here in the 
sense of a rhetorical exercise serving to inter-
pret criticism of a given occupational activity.
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The oral route? No, we don’t take that into account. There are strong recommendations 
not to eat your sandwich and not to smoke while spraying plant protection products, because 
it’s obvious that if you do you’ll get contaminated orally. It’s a bit problematic: Should we 
assess the recommended practice or should we assess all practices? If we assess practices 
that aren’t recommended we’re going to end up finding product use unacceptable in the vast 
majority of cases. (Interview with a head of ANSES plant protection preparation risk as-
sessment, January 2011)
MSA prevention specialists and ANSES experts have interpreted the study find-
ings in such as way as to render them consistent with the controlled used principle 
not primarily because the regulations and principles that frame their tasks and pro-
fessions dictate a particular manner of thinking but rather because they are trying to 
show that they themselves are acting in a manner consistent with their function. This 
quest for consistency is at the core of the uncomfortable knowledge displacement 
mechanism, and it is characterized by strong ambiguity. While actors continue to 
defend the controlled use principle, they also acknowledge that it is highly theoreti-
cal and quite removed from real practices. Maintaining this ambiguity is therefore 
a means of resolving the cognitive dissonance (Festinger, Riecken and Schachter, 
1956) that arises when actors organizing pesticide control in the workplace use their 
reflexive capacities.
Fragmentation: how the illusion of efficient pesticide 
surveillance is maintained
The sodium arsenite study demonstrated that occupational contamination oc-
curs even when the product is used in compliance with the conditions laid down 
with product sale approval. It therefore brought to light the lack of post-market-
ing approval monitoring, and it moved the plant protection product risk evaluation 
commission to take up the problem of how to organize more effective surveillance 
of occupational poisoning due to use of these products. However, despite the fact 
that post-approval monitoring of the harmful effects of pesticides has been com-
pulsory since European Union regulation 1107/2009 was passed, little attention is 
paid in France to the question of pesticide-related occupational poisoning. Recent 
official reports explicitly point up this problem. A report by the Conseil Général de 
l’Alimentation, de l’Agriculture et des Espaces Ruraux (CGAAER, General council 
on food, farming and rural areas) found that only three Ministry of Agriculture and 
ANSES requests for additional studies after marketing approval in 2010 concerned 
operator health (CGAAER, 2011: 17).26 And a Senate information-gathering task-
force report entitled Pesticides: vers le risqué zero [Pesticides: toward zero risk] 
(Bonnefoy, 2012: 11) came to a similar conclusion: “Products’ real health impacts 
are not adequately monitored after they have been approved for sale.” 
The administrative and organizational architecture of the system for managing 
occupational risk in the farming sector is itself responsible for poor post-approval 
monitoring. European Union regulation 1107/2009 contains three articles on the 
matter. The first (Article 31) in effect authorizes France’s Ministry of Agriculture 
26. The vast majority of requests for complementary studies—127 out of 148—concerned the de-
velopment of pest resistance to chemical agents. The remaining 21 concerned pesticide impact on 
biodiversity. 
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and ANSES to obtain further information from plant protection product companies 
when approving those products. The other two (Articles 44 and 56) stipulate that 
reviews of pesticide marketing authorizations are to be based on all available 
information. Article 56 also specifies that companies must keep the authorities 
informed on all harmful effects on human health of the products they market. In 
fact, once the French authorities have approved a product for sale, they demand very 
little information on pesticide dangers for operators, and companies produce very 
little such information once their products have been approved. 
The authorities in charge of risk assessment and management in connection 
with marketing approval are reluctant to require pesticide-producing companies to 
conduct complementary exposure studies, for two reasons. The first has to do with 
the heavy time pressure they are under. If complementary information is requested, 
the product can only be approved for three years (instead of the usual ten). And 
the fact is that postponing definitive marketing approval this way goes against 
ANSES’ priority of accelerating the process so that it will be able to handle the 
increasing number of applications.27 More to the point, the experts do not see any 
use in requesting complementary follow-up studies because to their minds, their 
own predictive estimations of pesticide effects on farmer health constitute a fully 
effective methodology. Because theirs is an “ethics of objectification” (Roqueplo, 
1997), they conclude that existing data indicating discrepancies between their 
methodology and reality are not significant enough to justify demands for further 
information before approving pesticides for marketing. And because it has not been 
possible to reproduce the interdisciplinary collaboration of the sodium arsenite study 
and thereby confirm and bolster the findings of that study, risk assessment specialists 
have difficulty taking those findings fully into account. 
Incentives to demand more stringent surveillance of a product once it is on 
the market are also weak. The main reason is the very existence of the MSA 
poisoning surveillance network, which all risk assessment and management system 
actors believe suffices for post-approval monitoring. Moreover, those actors do not 
consider the data produced by the network as particularly alarming. The 200 cases 
of occupational poisoning that it reports annually do not seem a high figure, or in 
any case not high enough to move actors to request companies to produce additional 
data. This in turn means that the companies have no trouble meeting regulatory 
requirements on post-approval monitoring of occupational poisoning due to use of 
their products: they just claim that poisoning cases remain “somewhat theoretical.”28 
They are legally justified in assuming that it is up to ANSES and the Ministry 
of Agriculture to request complementary exposure studies from them during the 
marketing approval process and to turn to the MSA and its poisoning surveillance 
network for information on occupational poisoning. Moreover, they claim that they 
more than meet regulation requirements through their “progressive actions”: bringing 
in academics to design projects for assessing operator exposure during application 
and the effectiveness of available safety protection equipment.29
27. According to the ANSES members we in-
terviewed, applications have increased by 30% 
in the last four years.
28. Interview with the director-general of
the IUPP pesticide producer association, Feb. 
2012.
29. In the last several years, the European
Crop Protection Association, representing plant 
protection product manufacturers at the EU 
level, has set up a Safe Use Initiative that con-
sists primarily of conducting exposure studies 
in southern European countries, the aim being 
to assist in designing more effective PPE. 
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Risk prevention actors’ discourse on network efficiency is therefore ambiguous. 
While recognizing the problem of underreporting, they cite the network’s existence 
as proof that regular post-marketing approval monitoring is in place and that it will 
eventually take more accurate account of real exposure conditions. The network 
appears to fulfill this function well because on two occasions it acted to discover 
exposure information that impacted on pesticide-related occupational risk assessment 
and management. The first was in connection with the 2001 ban on sodium arsenite 
(network data supported initial suspicions of vineyard worker poisoning); the second 
was the introduction in 2006 of a compulsory waiting period before workers can 
reenter treated fields, a period ranging from a few hours to several days depending 
on product toxicity30 (this followed on several network-reported poisoning cases). 
But network impact goes no further than these changes, primarily because of the 
afore-cited intrinsic flaws and limitations of this tool. And though the 2001 and 
2006 changes indicate that there were defects in the system for protecting pesticide-
exposed workers, surveillance actors think that they indicate just the opposite; that 
is, that the system functions well and can serve to alert the public authorities to 
unpredicted contamination cases.31 The shared belief that the poisoning surveillance 
network functions well conceals that fact that it provides very little long-term 
monitoring information of the sort that could be used in epidemiological studies 
of the chronic disorders caused by these products. No such monitoring procedure 
was put in place after the sodium arsenite study, for example, despite the fact that 
it had demonstrated that the bodies of observed vineyard workers had indeed been 
contaminated by this carcinogenic product likely to have long-term effects. For MSA 
actors, the lack of any change is justified by the fact that they also participate in the 
Agrican epidemiological study of cancer in the farmer population. But as explained, 
the MSA’s Hérault fund, which ran into opposition from the local winemaking 
profession following the ban on sodium arsenite, refused to participate in that study; 
it therefore in no way monitors the health of workers who were surveyed for the 
sodium arsenite study. In sum, the statistical invisibility of the occupational diseases 
that farmworkers are likely to contract after exposure to pesticides has bolstered the 
legitimacy of the existing prevention system when in fact that invisibility is partially 
due to the system. 
Neither the CGAAER report signaling inadequate post-marketing approval 
monitoring32 nor the lessons learned from the sodium arsenite episode have led to 
any substantial changes in the current system.33 Very simply, the actors involved see 
30. Six hours for outdoor application, 24
hours for irritants, 48 hours for products that 
can affect the entire organism through skin or 
respiratory tract contact.
31. This is attested by the CGAAER report,
which gives excessive credit to the MSA poi-
soning surveillance network for the ban on 
sodium arsenite and draws a reassuring con-
clusion about it: “Because farmworkers report 
[to the network] on a voluntary basis, it is hard 
to assess how representative [its information] 
is. But it did make possible a variety of pre-
vention and operator protection measures, in-
cluding withdrawal of sodium arsenite from 
the market after an exposure study launched in 
response to disturbing information it had sent 
up” (CGAAER, 2011: 19).
32. “The current arrangements need to be
clarified and considerably reinforced if they are 
to offer the health and environmental guaran-
tees expected of them” (CGAAER, 2011: 5).
33. France’s new law on the future of agricul-
ture, food and forests provides for permanent 
monitoring of pesticide impact on health and 
the environment, specifying that ANSES is in 
charge of this task. However, as we write, the 
Agency has not allotted any specific funding to 
perform it.
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no need to make any changes because in their opinion the arrangements necessary 
for regular monitoring of occupational poisoning are already in place. The dilution 
of responsibility for post-sale approval monitoring bolsters the illusion of control 
sustained by the existence of the MSA poisoning surveillance network. Because the 
division of labor at the MSA is such that several actors are responsible for monitoring, it 
becomes so fragmented that it is in fact not really carried out; the actors, meanwhile, 
feel that the opposite is true. Each feels that he or she is fulfilling their monitoring 
obligations and each lays the responsibility for requesting or producing possible 
missing information on someone else. The respective responsibilities of ANSES and 
the Ministry of Agriculture in this area are very vaguely defined; those administrative 
bodies rely primarily on data produced by the MSA’s poisoning surveillance network 
when it comes to noting possible pesticide-related workplace health problems. While 
they acknowledge the weakness of that network, they also claim that it is up to 
the MSA to strengthen it. The MSA meanwhile recalls that producing this type of 
data is not one of its official tasks, and that it is up to ANSES and the Ministry of 
Agriculture to systematize demands for post-approval monitoring during the risk 
assessment phase, as stated in the European Union regulatory documents cited 
above. This fragmentation mechanism ensures “distributed ignorance” (Heimer, 
2012) of poisoning among workers exposed to pesticides, ignorance that provides 
each system actor with good reasons to believe the system is functioning properly. 
As in the “structural secret” notion developed by Diane Vaughan (1996) in her study 
of the American aerospace industry, division of labor within the French system 
obstructs identification of potential problems. And in our example, whenever there 
is doubt about system reliability, actors always have the option of imputing the 
responsibility for protection to operators themselves since there are not enough solid 
data to demonstrate the fallacy in this reasoning. The belief shared by occupational 
pesticide use risk assessment and management system actors that existing use rules 
will ensure operator protection actually does just that: it makes operators responsible 
for the suffering those substances can cause. Hand-to-mouth contamination is often 
classified as the result of operator failure to follow basic hygiene rules. With this in 
mind, all system actors can reassure themselves by recalling that “a correctly used 
product shouldn’t cause any accidents.”34
*
* *
Ignorance of pesticide-related occupational poisoning in France is “organized” in 
that it is closely tied to the way the occupational risk regulation system in the farming 
sector is structured. However, the sodium arsenite study example demonstrates that 
the actors in this system do have some latitude to perceive system limitations and try 
to correct them. They are able to produce “uncomfortable” information that exposes 
flaws in the institutions they belong to as well as fragility in work place pesticide 
monitoring and control. But the very manner in which the system for preventing 
pesticide-induced occupational disorders is organized in turn works to domesticate 
that uncomfortable knowledge and to align it with existing, ordinary pesticide con-
trol arrangements. It provides system actors with resources for continuing to ignore 
34. Interview with the UIPP director-general in the free daily newspaper 20 minutes, Dec. 12,
2011. 
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what they have learned by way of epistemic innovations. Because that manner of 
organization weakens the type of actor alliances that produce uncomfortable knowl-
edge, displaces the meaning of uncomfortable findings and fragments responsibility 
for occupational poisoning surveillance, it gradually creates compatibility between 
uncomfortable knowledge and the system’s own ordinary orientations. While the 
system is capable of producing awkward facts, it also impedes reproduction and 
consolidation of them. To put it another way, the organizational structure provides 
support for a hermeneutics of uncomfortable knowledge. Hermeneutics, a term orig-
inally referring to interpretation of sacred texts, here designates the move to interpret 
awkward information in a way that will make it consistent with the routine rules that 
structure an organization. In this sense, organizational structures do indeed play the 
role of “cognitive architect” (Michaud and Thoenig, 2001), affecting the meaning 
that members attribute to their actions (Weick, 1995). But that cognitive frame is not 
mechanical, taking instead flexible, complex forms that simultaneously integrate and 
domesticate actors’ reflexive, critical abilities. 
Our study therefore makes it possible to get beyond the opposition between 
intentional and unintentional ignorance production. It seems reasonable to assume 
that unintentional ignorance is no longer such when uncomfortable knowledge 
production makes the actors aware of what they did not know. And yet continuing 
ignorance is not the result of deliberately constructed strategies either. In the case 
of pesticide-related risk in France, it is instead the product of an organizational 
and institutional construction process that began more than seventy years ago. 
The organizational architecture that developed during this long history obliges 
institutional actors to leave aside certain embarrassing problems in order to show 
that they are acting consistently with the policy, technical and scientific orientations 
that frame their official tasks. If we assume that this concern for consistency is 
what drives ignorance construction, it becomes clear that ignorance has a highly 
particular function within organized systems: like those systems’ formal structures, 
rules, guiding principles and division of labor, ignorance constitutes a foundation 
for routine organization. 
Can we conclude from this that alerts from members of institutions in charge 
of controlling health risks are systematically doomed to go unheard? Whatever the 
answer, our work highlights the ability of such institutions to “live with” alerts that 
are potentially abrasive to their own action logic. The broader question then becomes, 
are official risk management systems condemned to undertake institutional change 
only in the aftermath of crises or scandals? To answer this, we also need to study 
how risk management organizations domesticate uncomfortable knowledge over the 
long term: Do they cause that knowledge to disappear or do they preserve traces of 
it which, combined with other factors, may lead to profound institutional change? 
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